One of the tragic outcomes of Hizbullah's gradual takeover of Lebanese institutions since 2005, which became nearly complete with the Najib Mikati government, was the emasculation of the prime minster's post. Today, Mikati is no more influential than your local grocery store cashier.
When he took the post from Saad Hariri, it was clear that he had accepted to become what Michel Aoun became in 2005—a puppet figure, albeit with less return on investment because Mikati is arguably less hungry for power and cash than Aoun is.
So when some in March 14 ask for his resignation, they're going after a largely symbolic win at a time the country needs a more drastic shift in power balance. Whether Mikati stays or leaves, the situation in the country will not change. The country's institutions, including security forces that are not under the direct command of ISF head Ashraf Rifi and previously Wissam al-Hassan, answer to different bosses. March 14 could return to the cabinet tomorrow, but little will change. Just remember what happened when a March 14 government last tried to challenge Hizbullah's stronghold over security: the Iran-funded militia launched a devastating attack on the capital and laid siege to the PM's headquarters, among other atrocities, and eventually forced the capitulation of Walid Jumblatt.
Hizbullah acts slowly, and gradually, as opposed to March 14's short sighted knee jerk mode. And over the years, it has succeeded in neutralizing much of March 14's power. When hundreds of thousands of Lebanese took to the streets in 2005, the militia realized that it needed to counter any notion that peaceful change and protests can lead to change. Thus began the deployment of hundreds of thousands of their paid supporters to create the illusion of popular support. By occupying downtown Beirut, they turned it from a symbol of freedom and unity, into a symbol of occupation and division. And to eliminate the peaceful nature of any counter-Hizbullah protests, they sponsored the arming of street militias like the SSNP and their own people, and launched military assaults on defenseless Lebanese citizens. Most of the ones who once believed in peaceful change now stay home, and those who would rather pick up a gun or throw a Molotov cocktail now go out to "protest". And with Hariri largely broke and out of the country, Sunni Islamists started to rise and take center stage, providing Hizbullah with a useful diversion from the real issues.
In other words, Hizbullah cultivated the sectarian tensions in the country and helped revive dormant militancy in the ranks of its opponents to win the argument against its own militant status. And it successfully took over everything that matters to insulate itself and its "resistance" agenda.
Being as clueless as ever, March 14 fell into the trap of calling its supporters to the streets to protest the killing of al-Hassan, not realizing the changes that happened to those streets. Long gone are the days when Lebanese "protesters" can be trusted to independently deliver a message. Long gone are the days when the Lebanese "street" can be used to deliver change. It has been manipulated and corrupted beyond recognition. Thanks to Hizbullah's tactics and March 14's colossal electoral blunder in 2005 when they entered into an alliance with Hizbullah-backed Shias, the once peaceful movement of the so-called "Cedar Revolution" is now incapacitated, replaced by a few tire-burning nuts on wheels.
One could argue that the only obstacle to Hizbullah's supreme dominance had been the Information Branch led by al-Hassan before his assassination. It's probably the only database that Hizbullah did not have access to. With Rifi said to leave his post as ISF head soon, it is not clear what will happen to it. Mikati had refused to remove Rifi and al-Hassan, realizing that he couldn't go to that extreme in upsetting the Sunni base. So someone came and took care of that for him, further proving the point that Mikati could only delay the transaction for a while, but ultimately he's not the manager of goods.
So March 14 could seek another symbolic win by calling for a Mikati resignation. It's their right. Many will and should rightfully hold this government responsible. But selling this move as a pathway to change would be foolish, because the country needs a revolution that is hard to bring about without a major local and, I should add, regional power shift. And March 14 should start by reviewing its past (and recent) mistakes, and coming to terms with its own failures.