The settlement and the devil

A wave of cautious optimism struck the Lebanese political scene in the days preceding the Iranian-Saudi summit in Riyadh. Reports of an impending settlement to the "Lebanese file" before the March 28th Arab summit have invaded the Lebanese media. However, both parties to the conflict are waving a "plan B" should the Saudis and Iranians fail to agree on the details. And since the devil is in those details, and that devil goes by the name Bashar Assad, it is not clear how, exactly, the "file" will be "closed" sooner than "many Lebanese expect", as one "Arab source" told As-Safir.

The proposed settlement, according to Lebanese media, consists of the good old 19-10-1 "national unity government" formula, with the independent (the 1) chosen by the opposition camp, allowing them to rename the formula 19-11. Part of the settlement is also to form a joint committee from both camps to "study" amendments to the international tribunal without "emptying it", on the condition that a national unity government and the international tribunal are "concurrent"— meaning March 14 wants a guarantee that the new cabinet would approve the tribunal.  This "legal committee" would be given 5 days to study the tribunal's bylaws and suggest amendments that would please both parties.

But it is really up to the Iranians and Saudis to agree on a version of the tribunal that pleases both camps, and doesn't scare the Syrian regime. Ahmadinejad will likely represent the Syrian side in this, and the Saudi king has brought Saad Hariri to Riyadh for a rumored meeting with the street sweeper of Tehran. 

Hizbullah has been warning of American attempts to sabotage this settlement, and March 14 is not sure, even if the Iranians are on board, that the Assad regime would let the settlement pass. I tend to agree that the chances Assad would let the tribunal, amended or not, get to parliament, are slim. Even if Bashar gets invited back into the league of Arab despots, I doubt he would let parliament convene. While Hizbullah uses the US opposition to the Mecca agreement as evidence of Uncle Sam's allegedly obstructionist behavior, one does not need to dig deep for evidence of obstruction by the Assad regime: the recent terrorist attack in Ain Alaq, the daily discovery of explosives, and, if one must go back in time, the 2002 Beirut peace initiative, which was blown up by Assad's suicide agents, and finished off by Israel's army.

But if terrorism is the Assad regime's weapon of choice, what about the warring camps in Lebanon? Both camps have prepared plan Bs. Hizbullah's plan B seems to begin with "civil disobedience", and ends with Syrian-appointed President Emile Lahoud refusing to hand over power at the end of his term and appointing a care-taker government.

March 14's plan B begins with a chapter 7 resolution establishing the court, but it's not clear where it ends. Jumblatt and Hariri went to the US and Europe respectively to get endorsement for a potential chapter 7 resolution.

With a little Syrian help, civil war is always a possibility. Hizbullah's "resistance" is gradually expanding and accepting domestic enemies. Hizbullah's recent statements have clearly identified Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea as agents of the Great American conspiracy to create a "New Middle East". The Iranian-imposed truce with Hariri will not last long if the son of the slain goes for chapter 7. How a war would play out is up for speculation, but one thing is certain—all are arming, and not even Walid Jumblatt in his interview with Marcel Ghanem a few weeks ago could deny it. Last week, the Maronite Patriarch himself confirmed it. The war may not take the form of the 1975 war. I think we're looking at a de-facto partitioning of the country and collapse of the army, and one or two governments claiming legitimacy.  Chaos is the best anti-dote to rule of law, and the Hariri tribunal.

But let's not be too grim too soon. Can the Saudis really sponsor an end to this crisis, which plays out in Beirut, but has roots everywhere else in the region? The problem with "hoping against hope" at this point in time is that any settlement that does not factor in Hizbullah's weapons is not much of a solution. The assumption that these weapons are an "internal matter" no longer flies. And any fake appeasement of the Assad regime will not cancel the fact that no independent and sovereign Lebanon can exist, or be allowed to exist, as long as Bashar is in power. It's the sad truth that the Saudis do not want to discuss, for fear of stoking a fire that could eat up the entire region.

Ironically, only former warlords Jumblatt and Geagea, are articulating the truth of the matter. There can be no country with a militia in charge of security and war decisions, no country without an army with a clear mandate to confront plots against the state, and no country without secured borders and disengagement from regional and international struggles.

Comments

[Solomon2]

Hizbullah HQ ordered its combatants to show mercy when capturing and going beyond the villages harbouring traitors and colloborators, and handed them to the govt. instead of eliminating them like rats.

I'm not so sure that was out of generosity rather than (a) something quietly negotiated as part of the Israeli withdrawal, and (b) the fact that many Shi'a supported the Israelis in one fashion or another at some point in time, so harsh treatment of "traitors and collaborators" would have had the effect of splitting or destroying the famiies of numerous Hezbollah supporters.

[fubar]

AK,

Are you still watching closely or have you taken a break recently?

[Abu Kais]

I'm here, Fubar. Too much work and no "play". I'm still in the game. Shoot.

[Roman Kalik]

Regarding the Weingrid commitee,
Olmert said that there was a plan to respond with the military should Hezb kidnap soldiers. This is called a contingency plan, preparing for a possible event before it occurs.
Whereas Nasrallah claims that the war was prepared in advance, with no regard to any action of Hezb, and that in fact the kidnapping forced Israel to start their pre-planned war unprepared.
The difference is fairly easy to see.

[Liron]

And speaking of POWs Raz...
there were 3 lebanese prisoners in Israel when the war started (now there might be just a bit more...like maybe 10 tops)
One of those 3 is the infamous Samir Kuntar who is in Israeli prison after invading Israel from the sea and killing a family of Israelis, one of them a 4 year old girl who he bashed her head with the butt of his rifle....no doubt, a role model for all lebanese who you should celebrate his freedom (which I hope will never come).
2nd, how come Hizbollah doesnt "poke" Syria? since there are 1000's of lebanese prisoners there?
Not only do Hizbollah not kidnapp syrians, they don't even protest the fact that so many prisoners are held there.
Is it only when the jews hold prisoners (and rightfully so in my opinion) that the moral core of Hizbollah awakens?

[Roman Kalik]

To add to the above, how exactly would Samir Kuntar count as a POW? Was he part of the Lebanese army, or of a militia empowered to act by the Lebanese government? Was he in uniform?
He's just a criminal, a murderer. He didn't fight soldiers, he fought civilians and children. The fact that Hezb want his release says a great deal about them.