From Beirut to the Beltway

Syria's plan of attack

A few weeks ago, I posted something on Bahjat Suleiman's gates of hell scenario, which he said would open if Syria pulled out of Lebanon. His scenario went as follows:

He spoke of a hellish alliance whereby Palestinian refugees from Jordan and Syria would leave those countries to join the refugees in Lebanon and strike a war alliance with Hizbullah. The south Lebanon front would go up in flames, and the Lebanese would be divided and turn against one another. After that there will be chaos, the return of death, and the entire region will burn...

The following is based on reports in two Lebanese weeklies, al-Shiraa and al-Watan al-Arabi, published last week in Beirut. Some of what they are reporting was confirmed by Roed-Larsen in his report last week, so the information is not that hard to swallow. The Syrian confrontation (or war) plan seems straight out of the Lord of the Rings, with the "dark lords" of Syria, helped by "strategic partner" Iran, preparing to unleash an army of Islamist and radical Palestinian orcs that they have been breeding for a good number of years.

According to al-Watan al-Arabi, the Syrian regime is convinced that the United States and some in the international community will not stop until there is regime change in Syria. On the other hand, the United States and France became certain that Damascus had no intention of pulling its agents out of Lebanon, handing over top officials for a trial and stopping the flow of insurgents into Iraq.

For that, adds the weekly, Syria put in place contingency plans for an inevitable confrontation. To Damascus, such a battle is cheaper than surrendering to the American and international "conditions" which would cost the regime a lot more.

Al-Watan quoted American and western intelligence sources as saying that Damascus has been re-activating the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut axis since before the Hariri assassination. Syria's prime minister, Mohammad Naji al-Otari, flew to Tehran days after the Hariri assassination, where he flaunted a "strategic alliance" with Iran. (Otari had also recently warned that the gates of hell would open on the US if Washington invaded Syria)

The Syrian regime realized that it must first clean its own house. Any possibility of internal unrest, whether it's ethnic, religious or political, would have to be eliminated. The regime embarked on a "security and political cleansing" campaign , which saw the removal of vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam, the "neutralization" of former intelligence chief Bahjat Suleiman and the liquidation of the Ghazi Kanaan. One could add to this the crackdown on Syrian opposition figures in recent months.

As a result of this campaign, power is now concentrated in the hands of Bashar, Maher and Asef. Maher is in full control of the Republican Guard and the army and Asef of all the security services.

At the same time, the regime sought to reactivate its strategic alliance with Iran, which fears that a toppling of Assad's regime could threaten its own interests in the region, especially in Lebanon. Iranian and Syrian military and security officials have been meeting in secret to "put the final touches" on a "strategic and military" cooperation plan to confront what they believe to be a plot to topple the Syrian regime. Shawkat had reportedly visited Tehran shortly after his failed Paris visit, in which he might have offered Ghazale's head. It was followed up by the visit to Syria of a high-level delegation from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, headed by General Baqer zul-Qadr. Iran has reportedly supplied Syria with advanced weapons and Hizbullah has re-deployed and mobilized its members in accordance with this plan.

Al-Watan al-Arabi quotes unnamed sources as saying Hizbullah could be a main partner in this Syrian-Iranian plan of attack. In any case, the Party of God is very far from being disarmed. In fact, al-Watan reports, they have just received a new shipment of weapons and rockets that were stored in the Bekaa and the south.

The Syrian leadership has also been mobilizing pro-Syrian Palestinian factions in Lebanon and Palestine. Large amounts of weapons were smuggled into Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and hundreds of elements from the Yarmouk camp in Syria are on standby for deployment to Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli and Bekaa refugee camps. Ahmad Jibril, head of Iranian-backed PFLP-GC and Abu Moussa, head of Fateh-Intifada were assigned the task of mobilizing thousands of elements and taking over Palestinian decision-making in the camps.

Al-Shiraa confirmed that the PFLP-GC in Deir al-Ghazal has received weapons and ammunition through entry points in the border region of Wadi al-Asha'ir. The smuggling reportedly took place under the supervision of Syrian officer Samih al-Qashmaii who was stationed in Dhour el-Shoueir prior to the withdrawal.

Many of the Palestinian refugee camps have already fallen under the control of these factions and other Islamist groups such as Jund al-Sham.

Jund Al-Sham answers directly to Syrian military intelligence, according to al-Shiraa, which quoted Security sources as saying that Palestinians from the Yarmouk camp have been added to their ranks. The latest outbreak of violence between Jund al-Sham and the Nassirites in Sidon seems to indicate that that the ranks of the once small Ain-el-Helweh-based islamists are swelling with manpower and new weapons.

Jund al-Sham is one of many Islamist organizations that were nurtured by the Syrian regime. According to reports in al-Watan, and a recent French police report, the Iranian revolutionary guard has been training Islamists in camps in Iraq, Syria and the Bekaa in Lebanon.

Another Islamist organization in Syria's arsenal is al-Ahbash, which is practically run by Syrian military intelligence. Al-Shiraa describes al-Ahbash as an armed group that took over several mosques in Beirut by force with the support of the Syrian military intelligence. Syria recognized their potential as a tool to subjugate Lebanon's Sunnis in the 80s, and effectively used them to rein in any Sunni religious leader they deemed too independent. Al-Ahbash was probably behind the assassination of Mufti Hassan Khaled in the 80s.

The Lebanese authorities have found weapon caches in Beirut in warehouses owned by Ahbash members. The latter have infiltrated the Lebanese army and Presidential guard, and despite the arrest of Ahmad and Mahmoud Abdel Al, who were charged with planning the Hariri murder, I don't think we've seen the last of them.

The Lebanese authorities are obviously aware of the above, and this explains the recent confrontation with the PFLP-GC and Fateh-Intifada in the Bekaa, and the arrest of the Abdel- Al brothers.

The Syrian-Iranian plan, if allowed to go into effect, will turn Lebanon into another Iraq. The Syrian regime would much rather opt for brinksmanship than lose power or be weakened.

Lebanon vs. Arab failure

Arab rug politics have reared their ugly head again. The failure to admit that an Arab state is responsible for terrorism against another Arab state has galvanized some of the Arab press, not to mention Arab officialdom, into feeling sorry for a bunch of criminals who would throw every single Arab and Muslim to the lions just to stay in power.

I have been trying to stay moderate since the Mehlis report was published. Other blogs have expressed this frustration admirably. But this has gone too far.

We, the few Lebanese bloggers who have mobilized to blog the Mehlis report and show its significance not just to Lebanon but to the Arab world as a whole, are being accused of being blind to a wider US/Israeli plot to change the Syrian regime and destabilize the entire region. We are being lectured about the dangers of US interventionism and asked, not very politetly, to wake up and smell the scent of US conspiracy. We are being told to forget about our own independence as a nation, about justice within our borders, just to spite an “imperialist” nation that’s out to get a bunch of thugs holding their people hostage.

Rafik Hariri, the man whom Syria murdered (quit living in denial, they killed him), was one of the few Arab leaders who actually made a useful effort to support the Palestinian cause. He didn’t send weapons. He didn’t fire missiles. He didn’t fund stupid suicide attacks. He funded projects to bring their case to the international community through legal means. His foundations sponsored Lebanese victims of the Israeli occupation. He used his connections to spare Hizbullah and Lebanon the wrath of pro-Israeli policies. He was not a perfect man, nor a saint. But he did not deserve this fate.

It was Hariri who protected the resistance against Israel, not Syria. It was Syria that destroyed whatever was left of the cause, not the US or Israel. The blame rests on Syria’s shoulders this time. And it is a shame that very few so called Arabs out there refuse to come out in support of the country and the man who worked harder than many to support the cause they defend in the most inane way imaginable.

Let’s face it, we live in a region infested with shortsightedness and utter and unforgivable stupidity.

Arab leaders have made it clear that they have no time for Lebanon, a founding member of the Arab League, arguably the only country that keeps Arabs from the "ocean to the gulf" entertained and their companies running. They are worried about the threats against Syria, a bastion of Arab failure (and a reflection of their own). They will not tell the Syrian regime to cooperate in the investigation. They will stand watching and lamenting the self-destruction of a regime and blame it on foreign intervention. And they will do nothing of consequence. All that money and power will be channeled into growing their expanding bellies. All they can do right now is impale themselves on failure.

The Iran connection

Quoting an anonymous Iranian source, Ali Nourizadeh in Asharq al-Awsat wrote that the Mehlis report:

sent shockwaves through the Iranian leadership. Officials in Tehran were greatly worried because of the strategic links with Damascus and because the report mentioned the name of Ahmad Jibril, head of the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (general command) who maintains close links to the Iranian security and intelligence services. Iran had been warned that Washington was ready to adopt the same hard-line approach it was following with Damascus, the source reported.

The article goes on to focus on Iran-US relations and the nuclear issue (it makes bizarre claims about Iran’s supreme leader’s reported dissatisfaction with the performance of his "street sweeper" president, who has no real executive power).

Iran’s official reaction to the Mehlis report was predictable. The Iranian foreign minister said the report should not be “politicized” and hoped “a final report is composed and submitted based on technical and legal foundations.” Of course, given that Iran also praised the dismal Syrian “cooperation” with the probe, it is unlikely the report will ever be deemed acceptable by Iran.

Asharq al-Awsat reveals a connection that not many have made.

Naming PFLP-GC as major co-conspirators was one of the surprises of the report. Mehlis also expressed the desire during his Tuesday briefing to interview Jibril and members of his Damascus based organization. And judging from recent events along the Syrian border, the Lebanese authorities seem to close to a confrontation with them, though the details are sketchy.
Mehlis has a lot of leads, and we only know of the ones that lead to Syria.

But given Jibril's Iran connection, could Iran also be involved in the Hariri killing?

The most important question revolves around Hizbullah's role. I doubt they’re involved, at least not directly, but they stand to become the biggest losers if Mehlis implicates both Syria and Iran.

The denial and the other report

While Syria is busy denying involvement in the Hariri assassination, accusing the Mehlis report of bias and slander, another report will echo Mehlis's conclusions more forcefully by focusing on the present rather than the past.

Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN special envoy to Lebanon, has a mandate to examine what is going on in Lebanon now. He is expected to file a progress report on Syria’s implementation of UNSC 1559 soon.

According to Haaretz, the report will accuse Syria of continued “indirect military intervention and direct intelligence intervention in Lebanon,” inlcuding “arms shipments to various militias.”

Roed-Larsen’s report will reportedly state that “Damascus did not did not genuinely implement Resolution 1559, preferring instead to maintain its indirect military control of Lebanon through its agents in the Lebanese presidential palace, the army and intelligence organizations.”

And where the Mehlis report was unconvincing and inconclusive to some, Roed Larsen’s report will prove culpability by establishing a present and thus continuous pattern of criminal Syrian activity in Lebanon.

Roed-Larsen reportedly states explicitly that Hariri's murderers must be exposed as soon as possible.

The combined effects of both reports will likely lead to a harsher tone by the UN Security Council, possibly sanctions, says Haaretz.

Meanwhile, Syrian deputy foreign minister Walid Moallem denied that he had threatened Rafik Hariri days before he was assassinated.

"This is totally untrue," Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said in a call to a talk show on Syrian state television. "I did not go to Premier Hariri to make threats. I went to him to inform him about my mission and ask him to cooperate in order for the mission to succeed."

An excerpt from a RECORDED interview between Hariri and Moallem contradicts this claim. Here’s what he said on 1 February 2005:

Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, Please do not take things lightly.”

This does sound like a threat to me. But forget that. He went to ask the prime minister of another country to “cooperate in order for the mission to succeed?” What kind of mission was that?

This is similar to what Assad told Der Spiegel on 29 August, when he tried to deny he threatened to destroy Lebanon over Hariri’s head if the latter didn’t agree to the extension of Lahoud’s term. (The Mehlis report has multiple but similar accounts of this threat)

SPIEGEL: Many politicians in neighboring Lebanon blame your government for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Some have even said that the two of you had a loud argument the last time he was in Damascus.

Assad: And some have even said I threatened him. Others claimed a security agent
pointed his pistol at Hariri's head. That's simply ridiculous. In that conversation, we discussed extending the term of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. It's obvious that Hariri was against the idea. So I told him: "We don't want to pressure you. Go back to Lebanon and then give us your decision." He told us a few days later that he agreed with the plan. Why should Syria kill someone with whom it has no differences of opinion? It doesn't make any sense at all. In truth, we Syrians are the ones who ended up suffering the greatest drawbacks as a result of this affair.

SPIEGEL: Can you really completely rule out the possibility that neither your intelligence services nor any other Syrian is involved?

Assad: I'm absolutely certain. That kind of plan requires the cooperation of several individuals and organizations. If this cooperation had existed, we would have known about it.

The plan, the mission and the insulting and arrogant denial. Bashar told Hariri, the prime minister of Lebanon, about a Syrian "plan" to ILLEGALLY extend Lebanon's president's term. Moallem went to urge cooperation with a Syrian “mission.” These are not threats, these are calls for cooperation, Syrian style.

In the Syrian regime’s dictionary, a “threat” is called a threat if there is a gun or torture involved. To the military thugs who rule Syria, “credible evidence” of a threat requires the documented torture of Hariri in an underground Syrian prison, or a photograph showing Ghazaleh pointing a gun to his head, twisting his arm and attaching electrodes to his organs.

That’s the Syrian regime's culture for you, and that’s how they can continue to deny the undeniable despite the glaring evidence.

ISF fingers Syrian intelligence in bombings (updated)

Two days after the damning Mehlis report fingered Syrian intelligence, Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) said they arrested three suspects who confessed to being asked by a “non Lebanese” security service to carry out “terrorist operations”.

“Prior to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and at the request of an officer from a non Lebanese security service, fugitive Hassan M. (33), ordered a number of people to commit terrorist operations in Lebanon,” said the ISF statement. The operations included throwing sound bombs and starting firefights in different areas in the Mount Lebanon and Beirut governorates. According to the statement, the intention was to “sow confusion and threaten civil peace.”

The three arrested individuals said they did not carry out their orders and confessed to being paid large sums by the go-between Hassan M, who was presumably working for Syrian intelligence.

On Friday, the Mehlis report tied the Hariri assassination to the campaign of bombings that rocked Lebanon over the past few months:

The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could be links between
some, if not all, of them.

Addendum. Al-Mustaqbal named Syrian intelligence official Jamea Jamea as the person who charged Hassan H. to recruit the bombers.

The paper adds that Judge Said Mirza has detained Mahmoud Abdel-Al to question him about his involvement in the Hariri assassination.

Jamea Jamea is an important figure in the UN investigation. He has been linked to Ahmad Abdel-al, of al-Ahbash. Abdel-Al was interviewed as a witness and later as a suspect by the UN team. Mahmoud Abdel-Al is Ahmad's brother. He is the person who placed the phone call to Lahoud's mobile phone minutes before the explosion. (Lahoud's spokesman argued on Friday that the number Abdel-Al called was one of many numbers in Lahoud's office, denying that Lahoud himself had talked to him).

Here are relevant excerpts from the Mehlis report:

[Ahmad Abdel-Al]'s telephone records reveal that at 1147 hrs, he had a telephone contact with a number which phoned his home telephone number a number of times immediately before the explosion --- 1226 hrs, 1246 hrs and 1247 hrs. While Abdel-Al told UNIIIC that he called home shortly after the explosion at 1256 hrs, telephone records show that the call was made at 1254 hrs, two minutes before the explosion. Abdel-Al stated, that he did not leave the Al-Ahbash office the day of the blast for security reasons. The telephone records showed four calls to Syrian intelligence officer Jamea Jamea, at 1142 hrs, 1814 hrs, 2023 hrs and 2026 hrs.

According to a witness, Abdel-Al visited Jamea Jamea’s office the evening of the blast at 19:30 in which the two discussed Abu Adass. Moreover, shortly after his visit to Jamea Jamea’s office, Abdel-Al’s mobile phone registered a call to Rustum
Ghazali, at 1956 hrs. Abdel-Al also sought to steer the investigation towards Abu Adass , not only by providing the Lebanese authorities with extensive information on Abu Adass shortly after the blast, but also stating to UNIIIC that the Al-Ahbash Security Service had seen Abu Adass before the assassination in the Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian camp together with Abu Obeida the deputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar.

There are also numerous contacts between Ahmad Abdel-Al and Lebanese State Security on the day of the blast. For example, Abdel-Al had almost daily telephone contact with Brigadier General Faysal Rasheed, Chief of State Security in Beirut and on 14 February 2005, they had telephone contact at 1035 hrs, 2008 hrs, 2113 hrs, 214 hrs and 2216 hrs. Ahmad Abdel-Al also had contact with suspect Raymond Azar, of the Lebanese Army, on 14 February 2005, as well as 16 and 17 February 2005. There was a call between the mobile phone of Albert Karam, another member of the Lebanese Army Intelligence, and Ahmad Abdel-Al on 14 February as well, at 1212 hrs, about 44 minutes before the blast.

Abdel-Al’s phone also had extensive telephone contacts with Mustafa Hamdan’s phone, as 97 calls occurred between the two between January and April 2005. Of these, four were made on 14 February 2005, after the explosion. Ahmad had two telephone contacts with his brother, Walid Abdel-Al, a member of the Republican Guard, the day of the blast at 16:15 and 17:29. In addition, Abdel-Al received a call on 11 February 2005 at 2217 hrs from the same telephone booth used to call Al-Jazeera shortly after the blast on the 14 February. He also received a call on the 4 February 2005 at 19:34 and on 26 February 2005 at 0933 hrs from the booth used
to call Reuters shortly after the blast.

Abdel-Al has been in frequent contact with Mahmoud Abdel-Al, his brother, who is also active in Al-Ahbash. Mahmoud Abdel-Al’s telephone calls on 14 February are also interesting: he made a call minutes before the blast, at 1247 hrs, to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and at 1249 hrs had contact with Raymond Azar’s mobile telephone.

[Ahmad] Abdel-Al also has notable connections to a significant weapons store discovered in southern Beirut in July 2005. This weapons store was raided by the ISF on 26 July 2005 and five people, with close connections to the former Mourabitoun militia, were arrested. One of the arrestees was the driver and bodyguard of Majed Hamdan, Mustafa Hamdan’s brother, who runs a firm which reportedly provided security for the St. George hotelHotel. Abdel-Al reportedly arranged for another arrestee to be employed as an electrician in the presidential palace. Furthermore, immediately after the arrests, another individual fled and promptly telephoned Ahmad Abdel-Al.

The Lebanese judiciary is obviously beginning to act on the information submitted by Mehlis, a lot of which was not publicised so as not to undermine the investigation. (So those people who claim the Mehlis report is inconclusive and lacks hard evidence need to remember that the investigation is NOT finished).

Mehlis report summarized

The Mehlis report was an important step in the ongoing investigation into the murder of Rafik Hariri and 22 others. In a technical report intended for the UN Security Council and that left out details and leads that could "undermine" the ongoing investigation and future trial, Detlev Mehlis summarized the progress so far and presented some of the evidence accumulated by his and other commissions.

The commission’s work was made difficult by “recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have been carried out with impunity as well as by “deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses” that have deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC. For the first time, we see a link between these bombings, witness intimidation and the 14 February explosion. “The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could be links between some, if not all, of them.”

For that, Mehlis does not name many of his witnesses.

In the political context of the murder, Bashar Assad and Emile Lahoud are featured prominently as haters of Hariri. And so is a prominent Lebanese figure called Mr X. Though this came as no surprise, it was disturbing to read transcripts of phone calls and conversations where their plotting to discredit Hariri and turn the people against him was hinted on as possible motivation for a later decision to murder him. These transcripts and other testimonies confirm the pervasiveness of Syrian interference in Lebanon.

The UN Commission’s investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon have long asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful day-to-day and overall strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The apparent growing conflict between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad, was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through interviews and documents.

Mehlis was careful. He presented the evidence as is, and only made conclusions where he felt it was beyond reasonable doubt. So while the role of the massacre’s planners and executers was laid out in shocking and suspenseful clarity, he did not link their actions directly to their political masters (albeit through context, which could prove intent). This is partly due to the Syrian regime's unwillingness to co-operate substantively. Mehlis mentions a Syrian attempt to mislead the investigation by lying in a letter by the foreign minister and by scripting the responses of some of the Syrian witnesses they let Mehlis interview. In any case, the report does not exactly clear Lahoud and Assad, and that is important.

Syria was not the only country that did not co-operate. In fact, “no member state relayed usable information to the investigation”. In other words, despite all their talk and excitement about punishing the culprits and Syria, the United States, France and Britain did not provide usable intelligence, but only "expertise."

The Lebanese judicial and security authorities who have assisted Mehlis are painted positively in this report, much to the surprise of many. This leads us to think that if given independence and proper technical and logistical assistance and training, a Lebanese investigation could carry forward the investigation-- a Mehlis recommendation.

The blast was most likely the result of a suicide bombing, though the identity of the bomber could not be ascertained considering the amount of tampering that went on at the scene (the Lebanese security services perhaps intentional mishandling of the investigation prior to Mehlis’s arrival is fully described).

A witness, one of the few named, Mohammad Siddiq, claims that Abu Adass, the star of a video in which he claimed responsibility for the killing on behalf of an unknown Islamist organization, was kidnapped and taken to Syria where he was killed by Syrian military intelligence. His body was placed in the white Mitsubishi van that carried the explosives. The Mitsubishi was stolen in Japan, somehow made it to Syria, where it was fitted with 1000 Kg of high explosives.

The evidence from the phone trail I think is the strongest. It links all of the suspects in a web of conspiracy that also included President Lahoud, who, according to phone records, received a call from one suspect minutes before the blast. In addition to the security officials who are now in Lebanese custody, a few Ahbash officials were named as major co-conspirators with strong connections to the presidential guard and the president himself. The Ahbash is a pro-Syrian radical islamist organization with an important following in the country. PFLP-GC is also named. And of course, the Syrian military intelligence.

Read the report in full here. Conclusions here. One final note. The report reveals how much money and effort was put into monitoring Hariri and planning for his murder. The job of Lahoud’s security agencies became to assassinate a Lebanese official. This alone is grounds for treason.

Here are some excerpts from the report. I have published conclusions and other excerpts elsewhere on this blog. These are details that stuck out to me.

A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004
appeared to bring the conflict to a head...

Bashar to Hariri (Saad testifying): President Lahoud is me. Whatever I tell him, he follows suit.

In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed about the actions of Mr. Hariri by the Syrian security services and Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri.

Hariri: “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This will no longer happen.”

During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, “Please do not take things lightly.”

One witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon, who claims to have worked for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, has stated that approximately two weeks after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559, Maher Assad, Assef Shawkat, Hassan Khalil, Bahjat Suleyman and Jamil Al-Sayyedsenior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. (from a draft copy.. the final version does not name them)

Mr. Saddik stated that the decision to assassinate Mr. Hariri had been taken in Syria, followed by clandestine meetings in Lebanon between senior Lebanese and Syrian officers, who had been designated to plan and pave the way for the execution of the assault. These meetings started in July 2004 and lasted until December 2004. The seven senior Syrian officials and four senior Lebanese officials were alleged to have been involved in the plot.

Accroding to a witness, ISF personnel were ordered to keep Mr. Rafik Hariri under surveillance (witness statement) at the end of January and beginning of February 2005

The investigations shows that eight telephone numbers and 10 mobile telephones were used to organize surveillance on Mr. Hariri and to carry out the assassination. The lines were put into circulation on 4 January 2005 in the northern part of Lebanon, between Terbol and Menyeh. The lines were used on individual days to observe Mr. Hariri’s habits, mostly in the area of Beirut city.

In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General Sayyed to Judge Mezher, General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas, who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite participant in the assassination.” The only basis provided for this conclusion was the statement
that “[t]he way in which he delivers the statement and shows himself without any covering over his face is the manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The fact that he did not conceal his face while making the statement indicates that he must have been personally responsible for setting off the explosion.”

On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, [General Security head Jamil al-Sayed] got a phone call from a journalist from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up the Abu Adass videotape

There is no evidence that Abu Adass Mr. Abu Adass belonged to the group al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham as claimed in the Al-Jazeera videotape, nor even that such a group has ever existed or does exist now. There are no indications (other than the videotape) that he drove a truck containing the bomb that killed Hariri. The evidence does show that it is likely that Mr. Abu Adass left his home on 16 January 2005 and was taken, voluntarily or not, to Syria, where he has since disappeared.

On the instructions of the first investigating judge of the Military Court, and with the approval of the General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou barracks..

The measures taken [to preserve the crime scene] were below the required level and contrary to the obvious fundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this one or even less serious crimes are investigated...

few hours after the explosion took place, around 2300 hrs, major evidence was
removed from the crime scene...

A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on the day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in the evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the Minister of Interior and Municipalities got knowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and preserve the crime scene as it was. (This would be Franjieh)

On 15 February….Mr. General Al-Hajj (head of ISF) replied that two teams were working on clearing the road which would be reopened at 1000 hrs. In response to a direct question, GeneralMr. Al-Hajj stated that the orders came from Mustapha Hamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard

In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General Rifi stated that the person who gave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the crime scene to fill the hole caused by the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who at the time of the incident was the Commander of President Lahoud’s security detail and therefore by Lebanese law had nothing to do with issues related to crime scene investigation

the most likely scenario for the activation of the IED is a suicide bomber.

It was indicated that President Assad would not be available for any interview.

The Commission has concluded that the Government of Syria’s lack of substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded the investigation and made it difficult to follow leads established by the evidence collected from a variety of sources.

Update: A useless debate is raging about the two different versions of the Mehlis report: one with the names of the Syrian officials, one without. Ramzi has a good summary and an equally good explanation.

Ghazali: Let Hariri be the laughing stock

From the Mehlis report. This is how Syria ruled Lebanon and turned Lebanese people against Rafik Hariri. Some bloggers are speculating that Mr X might be Nabih Berri.

The structure and organization of the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services in Lebanon at the time of the blast, including protocols for reporting, shows a pervasive impact on everyday life in Lebanon.

Good examples of this are documents collected from the former Syrian Intelligence post, Villa Jabr, at Bologna Forest, Lebanon and an intercepted telephone conversation between Brigadier General Rustum GhazaliGeneral Ghazali and a prominent Lebanese official on 19 July 2004, at 0945 hrs
(excerpt):

“
“Ghazali:I know it is early but I thought we should keep up you posted. The President of the Republic told me this morning that they are two to rule the country the Prime Minister and him. He said that things cannot continue this way. The Prime Minister is always irritating him and we are always shutting him up and yelling at him. He made it clear he cannot continue this way.
(...)
X: Take it easy on me. Can you appoint a new Government at this time?

Ghazali: Yes we can appoint one. What could be the problem? We can name Botros Harb.
(…)
Ghazali: Let me tell you one thing. Let the worker’s movement take the street on the 20th in Solidere and Koraytem.

X: Let’s speak it over. Take it easily. I have to take into consideration the best interests of Syrian and Lebanon.

Ghazali: We are keen on Syria’s best interest but I am now talking about Rafik
Hariri.

X: So, the decision is taken.

Ghazali: I wish to tell you one thing. Whenever we need to speak to Hariri we have to suck up to him and he does not always answer.

X: To hell with him. What do I care about him?

Ghazali: What do I care about him? The President can’t stand him so why should I?

X: Fine, may he rot in hell …
(…)
Ghazali: No. Let him be the laughing stock and be pointed at as the person who ruined and indebted the country. Let the people take the street in Koraytem and Solidere; let the manifestations continue until he is forced to resign like a dog.

X: What about another option. I send him a message saying: Resign God damn it.

Ghazali: No, don’t send him a message or else he will say they forced me to resign. Let the street … you know what I mean. Or else he will use this as a bargaining card with his American and French masters.

X: So shall we leave things to the street?

Ghazali: This is better.

X: Let’s go for it.

The conversation Hariri taped: Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria, said Hariri

So it wasn't the conversation with Bashar that was taped, as al-Seyassah had reported. It was with Walid al-Moallem, who was in charge of the Lebanon file. Here are excerpts from the Mehlis report:

Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al- Moallem on 1 February 2005:

“In connection with the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time has come for you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was totally flustered, at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I have decided to do this, don’t answer me, think and come back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us or against us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”

28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed about the actions of Mr. Hariri by the Syrian security services and Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri.

Translated excerpts of the meeting include the following statements by Mr.
Hariri:

“I cannot live under a security regime that is specialized in interfering with Hariri and spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar Assad.”

“But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This will no longer happen.”

During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, Please do not take things lightly.”

30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem’s witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1 February meeting as “friendly and constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the questions put to him.

The Mehlis report conclusions (updated)

Main conclusions of the Mehlis report (you can also read it here)

- "It is the Commission’s view that the assassination of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over the course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his convoy recorded in detail."

- "Building on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge."

- "The likely motive was political. However, since the crime was not the work of individuals but rather of a sophisticated group, it very much seems that fraud, corruption, and money-laundering could also have been motives for individuals to participate in the operation. "

- the continuing investigation should be carried forward

- "It is the Commission’s conclusion that, after having interviewed witnesses and suspects in the Syrian Arab Republic and establishing that many leads point directly towards Syrian security officials as being involved with the assassination, it is incumbent upon Syria to clarify a considerable part of the unresolved questions. While the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limitedcertain degree with the Commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements. The letter addressed to the Commission by the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic proved to contain false information. The full picture of the assassination can only be reached through an extensive and credible investigation that would be conducted in an open and transparent manner to the full satisfaction of international scrutiny. "

Addendum: From the introduction: "In producing this report the Commission has endeavored to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities."

Don't expect to read details about current investigation leads, the investigation is still ongoing.

Also keep in mind this report is intended mostly for the UN security council.

Mehlis report: Syrian military intelligence killed Rafik Hariri